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Abstract
This paper extends a mixed oligopoly model developed by
Matsushima and Matsumura (MM) into a two−dimensional
space with one public firm and two private firms. By doing
so, another type of equilibrium is established : In one dimen-
sion the private firms choose the same location, whereas in
the other dimension they are located equidistant from the cen-
ter in the opposite direction from each other. We found that
when the public firm moves toward the private firms with lower
transport costs, the private firms approach the public firm in
one dimension. On the other hand, the private firms move away
from the public firm in the other dimension. This is in sharp
contrast to full agglomeration in MM, where private firms just
move away from an approaching public firm.
1．Introduction
Hotelling’s (1929) seminal work showed that duopolistic
firms agglomerate in the center of a one−dimensional
space (a linear city) although d’Aspremont et al. (1979)
revised the result as maximum differentiation under
Bertrand spatial competition. As another branch of re-
search, Hamilton et al. (1989) and Anderson and Neven
(1991) developed location−then−quantity games, which
showed the agglomeration of firms in the center (mini-
mum differentiation).
Since the appearance of a study by Merrill and
Schneider (1966), mixed oligopoly that has different
objectives of agents in a market (typically, there are
private and public sectors) has been a big issue in the-
ory and practice.1) The synthesis of location and mixed
oligopoly theories has been developed as a result. For
example, Cremer et al. (1991) analyzed location−price
competition with the public sector.
Matsushima and Matsumura (2003, henceforth, MM)
focused on an observation that in mixed markets private
firms often provide a different good or service from those
offered by the public sector, although the offering might
be similar to that of other private firms’ (herd behavior
of private firms).2) To explain their observation, MM in-
corporated a welfare−maximizing public firm into a spa-
tial Cournot model. As a result, in their circular city all
private firms agglomerate at a point that is the farthest
from the public firm.3) In their linear city represented
by the line segment , there are two types of equilibrium:
(i) All private firms agglomerate near the edge (at
around 1/10), whereas the public firm locates near the
center (1/2), or (ii) Two locations that are symmetric
with regard to the center (specifically, 1/10 and 9/10)
have half of the private firms each, and the public firm
locates at the center if and only if the number of the
private firms is even.
In sum, a public firm has a strong repelling effect
against private firms because the public firm sets the
price in each market at its transport cost in that location
(marginal cost pricing) to maximize the social surplus.
Hence, markets near the public firm are very competi-
tive with the private firms. Because each price is effec-
tively determined by the location of the public firm,
optimal location choices for private firms that have the
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same cost conditions become identical. Consequently,
they often agglomerate.
In this study we extended MM into a two−dimensional
space. In studies with two−dimensional Cournot com-
petition but without a public sector, Berenguer−
Maldonado et al. (2005) showed that firms agglomerate
in the center when space is a disk.4) Because this ag-
glomeration result is essentially identical as in one−
dimensional space (Hamilton et al., 1989 ; Anderson
and Neven, 1991), one may think that dimensionality
hardly matters. However, at least in Bertrand spatial
competition, dimensionality has an important role. In
their location−then−price competition in a multi−dimen-
sional space, Tabuchi (1994) and Irmen and Thisse
(1998) show that maximum differentiation occurs in
only one dimension, while minimum differentiation is
achieved in each of the other dimensions. Hence, we
cannot directly predict from a one−dimensional case how
firms will react against their rivals in location. For this
reason, we tackled the case of a mixed oligopoly model
in two−dimensional space.
Another reason for the expansion of dimensions is
from a casual observation in the real world. MM sug-
gested “Television programs supplied by the Japan
Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) are quite different
from those of private broadcasting companies, which
are quite similar to each other.” It seems true that a
public broadcasting company would prefer a more
serious program like news to an entertainment or a
shopping program, which seems to be more suitable for
private broadcasting companies. However, to be politic,
a public company may choose, or be effectively re-
quired to choose, a moderate course, while positions of
private companies often differ: e.g., they may feature
conservative or liberal content. Such a complex posit-
ioning, which we will see as partial agglomeration
below, can be analyzed by a multi−dimensional model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, the two−stage location−then−quantity game
is presented. In Section 3, quantity choice is analyzed
in the second stage. In Section 4, we analyze location
equilibria in the first stage. Section 5 summarizes the
results of our analysis.
2．The model
Our model is based on a one−dimensional model de-
veloped by Matsushima and Matsumura (2003), who
analyzed location−then−quantity competition with a
welfare−maximizing public firm and profit−maximi-
zing private firms. We extend the analysis to a
two−dimensional model with simplification in two
ways: First, the functional form of transport costs is
assumed to be quadratic in Euclidean distance,
and second, the number of private firms is two. Except
for those aspects, the MM model and this model are
identical so they can be compared easily.
We consider a two−dimensional city expressed by a
square on the x−y coordinates, L={(x , y)  R2 :－1 
x 1, －1 y1}, and consumers are uniformly and
continuously distributed on L with a density of one at
each location. There are a welfare−maximizing public
firm (firm 0) and two profit−maximizing firms (firm 1
and firm 2) that supply a homogeneous good with zero
marginal cost. Let the location of firm i be (xi, yi)L.
In the first stage, each firm simultaneously chooses
its location. In the second stage, each firm simultane-
ously chooses its quantity given firms’ locations. We
use subgame perfection as the equilibrium concept.
Based on the literature, firms bear transport costs, and
they can set a supply amount for each location in-
dependently because arbitrage between consumers is
assumed to be prohibitively costly.
Each consumer hasthesameinversedemandfunction,
as follows:
P (x , y)＝a－bQ (x , y), Q (x , y)


qi(x , y), (1)
where P (x , y) is the price at (x , y), qi(x , y) and Q (x ,
y) are the supply amount of each firm and the total sup-
ply amount there, respectively, and a and b are positive
constants.
The transport costs are the same for the firms and
are linear to supply amounts. The unit transport cost is
quadratic with regard to Euclidean distance between
a firm and a consumer. Let di(x, y) denote the distance
between a consumer at (x, y) and firm i. Then, the trans-
port cost function is given by
tdi(x , y)2＝t[(xi－x)2＋(yi－y)2],
where t is the transport cost parameter and is assumed
to be sufficiently low, such that
a＞24t , (2)
which ensures that the public firm always serves the
entire city, irrespective of any locations of the firms.
For private firm i, the local profit earned at (x, y) and
the total profit are respectively given by
πi(x , y)＝qi(x , y) [P (x , y)－tdi(x , y)2],
Πi＝
L
πi(x , y)dxdy ,
where P (x , y) is given by (1). Let w(x , y) denote the
local social surplus (consumer surplus plus the sum of
the profits) at (x , y), and then we get
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w(x , y)＝ 


(a－bm)dm－


tdi(x , y)2 qi(x , y)],
and the (total) social surplus is
ss＝
L
w(x , y)dxdy .
3．Quantity choice
By backward induction, we analyze the second−stage
quantity game under given locations. In this stage, we
can apply the same analysis in MM because only distance
matters, irrespective of dimensionality. Therefore, some
important results in MM are clearly valid in our model
as well ; we readily have the following results.
Result 1 (Lemma 1 in MM ) In equilibrium ,
P (x , y)＝td0(x , y)2, Q (x , y)＝
a－td0(x , y)2
b
(3)
Result 2 (Lemma 2 in MM ) Consumer surplus, cs, does
not depend on (xi, yi) (i＝1, 2) and is given by
cs＝
L
cs(x , y)dxdy
＝ 245b [45a
2－30at(2＋3x20＋3y20)
＋t2(28＋45x40＋45y40＋120x20＋120y20＋90x20 y20], (4)
where cs(x , y) is consumer surplus at (x , y):
cs(x , y)＝
[a－td0(x , y)2]2
2b
.
Result 3 (Lemmas 3 and 4 in MM) Firm i (i＝1, 2) sup-
ply positive amount of qi(x , y) at (x , y) if and only if
d0(x , y)＞di(x , y). Then,
qi(x , y)＝
t [d0(x , y)2－di(x , y)2]
b
,
and its profit is given by
πi(x , y)＝b[qi(x , y)]2.
Result 4 (Lemma 5 in MM ) The profit of each private
firm does not depend on the location of the other private
firm. And the total profit of firm i (i＝1, 2) is given by
Πi(x0, y0, xi, yi)＝
Li
πi(x , y)dxdy , (5)
where Li (i=1, 2) denotes the domain in which firm i serves :
Li＝{(x , y) : d0(x , y)＞di(x , y)}L.
In Result 2, note that if we rewrite (x0, y0) as (rcosθ, rsinθ),
then we have
cs＝2[45a2－30at(2＋3r2)＋t2(28+120r2＋45r4)]/45b .
Because cs/θ＝0 and cs/r＝60tr[－3a＋(4＋3r2)
t]＜0 (the inequality is due to (2)), the nearer to the
center the public firm locates, the greater cs becomes.
In Result 4, we find that the market boundary of
d0(x, y)＝di(x, y) is the perpendicular bisector of the line
segment joining the locations of firm 0 and firm i.
4．Location equilibrium
We analyze the first−stage game given the results in the
second stage. Without loss of generality, we henceforth
assume that 0x0, y01. Furthermore, because of
symmetry, if (x0, y0, x1, y1, x2, y2)＝(0, 0, 1/2, 1/2,－1,－1)
were an equilibrium, then a rotationally symmetric
location pair, e. g., (0, 0,－1/2,－1/2,－1, 1), must be
another equilibrium. For notational convenience, we
will omit such other symmetric equilibria.
First of all, symmetry yields the following result.
Lemma 1 The public firm locates on the x−axis (the y−
axis) if and only if the private firms locate equidistantly
away from the x−axis (the y−axis) in opposite directions
from each other. In other words, in equilibrium , x0＝0⇔
x1＋x2＝0, and y0＝0⇔y1＋y2＝0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This lemma classifies the types of location equilibria.
For the public firm to choose the center, the private firms
must locate symmetrically with regard to the center.
Let this case be central symmetry, which will be analyzed
in Subsection 4. 1 below.
On the other hand, unless the public firm locates
on either of two axes, symmetry breaks down. From
Result 4, we see that the profit functions of both
private firms are only dependent on their own location
and the location of the public firm; hence, both firms
would choose the same location, (x1, y1)＝(x2, y2). We
name this case full agglomeration , which appears in
Subsection 4. 2.
At last, there is another possibility: the public firm
is located on only one axis. For example, suppose that
x0＝0 and y0≠0. In this case, x2＝－x1 must hold, but
the symmetry with regard to the y−coordinate has
broken down. Again from Result 4, we see that the
private firms would locate the same position with regard
to the y−coordinate. We call this partial agglomeration.
Subsection 4. 3 will demonstrate this case.
Central symmetry and full agglomeration were also
presented in the linear−city case of MM. On the other
hand, partial agglomeration is new and only derived by
a multi−dimension model.
4. 1 Central symmetry
First, we focus on the possibility of central symmetry.
Under this scheme, we have the location equilibrium
as follows.
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Proposition 1 Under the scheme of central symmetry, there
exists a unique location equilibrium such that
(x0, y0, x1, y1, x2, y2)＝(0, 0, −2/3, −2/3, 2/3, 2/3).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium,5) which corresponds
to one of the equilibria in MM (Proposition 4 (ii) in
MM): the public firm locates at 1/2, half of the private
firms locate at 1/10 and the others locate at 9/10 in a
linear city of a line segment [0, 1].
Unlike Tabuchi (1994) and Irmen and Thisse (1998),
private firms differentiate with regard to all dimensions
here. As Irmen and Thisse (1998) indicated, the key is
the length of the market boundary between the public
firm and the private firm. Roughly speaking, the length
corresponds to the price elasticity of demand. The
shorter the boundary, the less the loss of demand when
a firm places higher prices on its good (low price elastic-
ity). In our model, when (x0, y0, x1, y1) ＝ (0, 0, −2/3, −2/3),
the length of the market boundary between firm 0
and firm 1 is 42/31.88562. On the other hand, if
(x0, y0, x1, y1)＝(0, 0, −1, 0), which represents differen-
tiation in one dimension only, the length of the market
boundary is 2. Therefore, the elasticity is lower in differ-
entiation in both dimensions as in Proposition 1.
It is true that locating at (x1, y1)＝(−1, −1) minimizes
the boundary when (x0, y0)＝(0, 0). However, Cournot
competition has a relatively stronger centripetal force
(Hamilton et al., 1989; Anderson and Neven, 1991).
Consequently, such trade−off yields our interior locat-
ion equilibrium.
4. 2 Full agglomeration
We analyze the case of full agglomeration. Remember
that consumer surplus depends on a (cs/a＞0), but
the profits of the private firms do not (Result 2 and
Result 4). Hence, when a is sufficiently large, effec-
tively the public firm only cares about the consumer
surplus. As a result, when a→∞, the public firm
chooses (x0, y0)＝(0, 0). When (x0, y0)＝(0, 0), as Sub-
section 4. 1 shows, a private firm would choose (x1, y1)
＝(−2/3, −2/3). Because of independence from the
other firm’s location with regard to affecting its profit,
we have the following.
Proposition 2 Under the scheme of full agglomeration,
we have
lim
a→∞
(x0, y0, x1, y1, x2, y2)＝(0, 0, −2/3, −2/3, −2/3, −2/3).
Figure 2 illustrates the situation. However, from
Lemma 1, we know that (x0, y0)＝(0, 0) is consistent
only in the case of central symmetry. Hence, we
conduct a comparative statics in the vicinity of
(x0, y0, x1, y1, x2, y2)=(0, 0, −2/3, −2/3, −2/3, −2/3).
Let
0＜τt/a＜ 124, (6)
then the solutions depend only on τ. From the first−or-
der conditions,ss/x0＝0,ss/y0＝0,Πi/xi＝0 and
Πi/yi＝0 (i＝1, 2), our comparative statics yields
dx0
dτ
＝
dy0
dτ
＝3
dxi
dτ
＝3
dyi
dτ
＝
512
729－2252τ
＞0, (7)
where the inequality is due to (6) . This result indicates
that the public firm locates slightly away from the cen-
Figure 1．（Central symmetry）：The circle represents the public firm; two stars show the private firms.
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ter to a point on a diagonal of L, while the private firms
slightly approach the public firm on the same diagonal
(Figure 2).
Unfortunately, the complexity of the equations
prevents us from obtaining an analytical solution. Thus,
we conduct a numerical analysis, and the computation
yields the following result (Table 1). Under the restri-
ction by (6), the equilibrium location is quite near the
location in the case of a→∞. And each decrease
in τ by 0.01 leads an increase in x0 and y0 by approxi-
mately 0.004 and an increase in x1 (y1, x2, y2), by
approximately 0.0013, the ratio of which is consistent
with the comparative statics in (7).
The intuition behind the result is as follows. The
greater τ becomes, the more the public firm cares
about the profits of the private firms. The movement of
the public firm along the diagonal is the best way to
separate from the private firms, with the loss of the
consumer surplus being minimized because the con-
sumer surplus is dependent only on the distance be-
tween the public firm and the center. Then, once the
public firm goes away from the center, the private
firms have incentives to approach the center due to
relaxed competition.
4. 3 Partial agglomeration
We can guess from Lemma 1 that if the public firm lo-
cates on either the x−axis or the y−axis, then there is
an equilibrium where the private firms are symmetric
with regard to that axis. Unfortunately, because the ana-
lytical insolvability continues, we will repeat a similar
analysis as in full agglomeration. Without loss of gener-
ality, we only deal with the case where the public firm
locates on the y−axis (x0＝0).
First of all, the limit case of a→∞ yields the following
outcome.
Proposition 3 Under the scheme of partial agglomeration,
we have
lim
a→∞
(x0, y0, x1, y1, x2, y2)＝(0, 0, −2/3, −2/3, 2/3, −2/3).
Figure 3 represents this case. Furthermore, we pro-
ceed to an analysis in the vicinity of the limit case above.
Holding x0＝0, a comparative statics that is evaluated
at (y0, x1, y1, x2, y2)＝(0, −2/3, −2/3, 2/3, −2/3) yields
dy0
dτ
＝
512
729－1996τ
＞0,
dx1
dτ
＝－
dx2
dτ
＝
1024
2187－5998τ
＞0,
Table 1．The location under full agglomeration．
τ 0．01 0．02 0．03 0．04 0．0417＝1/24
x0＝y0 0．0036 0．0075 0．0116 0．0161 0．0168
x1＝y1＝x2＝y2 －0．6655 －0．6642 －0．6628 －0．6613 －0．6611
Figure 2．（Full agglomeration）：The overlapping stars mean the agglomeration of the private firms.
The arrows depict the movements for the firms when τ increases.
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dy1
dτ
＝
dy2
dτ
＝
512
2187－5998τ
＞0,
where the inequalities are due to (6). Note that
dy0
dτ
:
dx1
dτ
:
dy1
dτ
＝3 : 2 :－1. (8)
When the public firm moves slightly northward from
the center, firm 1 moves southeastward from (x1, y1)＝
(−2/3, −2/3) (Figure 3). A numerical analysis confirms
a successive movement as follows (Table 2) . Further-
more, we can confirm that the magnitude of movement
is consistent with the comparative statics in (8) as
in full agglomeration.
The movement is quite different from that in full ag-
glomeration, where the public firm just approaches the
private firms to push them toward the edges. In partial
agglomeration, the private firms do move away from the
public firm in one dimension, although they approach
it in the other dimension. The market boundary is a key
to understanding what occurs.
Suppose that (x0, y0, x1, y1)＝(0, 0, −2/3, −2/3) as an
initial state (Figure 4). If the public firm moves slightly
northward from the center (x0, y0)＝(0, ε), the bound-
ary rotates counterclockwise a little bit. Hence, the
northwestern markets become more competitive
(near domain A in Figure 4). On the other hand, the
southeastern markets become less competitive (near
domain B in Figure 4). Therefore, firm 1 has an incen-
tive to move southeastward, by which the firm can
avoid keen competition.
Recall that Tabuchi (1994) and Irmen and Thisse
(1998) show that differentiation is sufficient only in one
dimension. Similarly, competition against the public
sector is sufficient only in one dimension for private
firms, and in the other dimension private firms should
seek their niches.
5. Concluding remarks
We have analyzed an extended model of spatial mixed
oligopoly. Some of our results are similar to those found
in a linear city of MM (central symmetry and full agglom-
eration). As a new result, we have partial agglom-
eration, where private firms differentiate in only one
dimension. Furthermore, the reactions of the firms
to a change in transport costs are analyzed. When
the public firm approaches the private firms, the
private firms differentiate more in one dimension,
Table 2．The location under partial agglomeration．
τ 0．01 0．02 0．03 0．04 0．0417＝1/24
y0 0．0036 0．0074 0．0115 0．0158 0．0165
x1＝－x2 －0．6642 －0．6617 －0．6589 －0．6559 －0．6553
y1＝y2 －0．6679 －0．6691 －0．6704 －0．6717 －0．6719
Figure 3．（Partial agglomeration）：The locations of the public firm（the circle）and the private firms（the two stars）．
The arrows represent the movements of the firms when τ increases.
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whereas they differentiate less in the other dimension.
We could extend the analysis by considering more
than two private firms. Although the completion of analy-
sis may not be an easy task, we could predict the answer.
For example, let the number of firms, n, equal 4, and
suppose that a public firm chooses the center. Then, it
is likely that four private firms are dispersed at (k, k),
(k, －k), (－k, k), (－k, －k), where k is a constant
(0＜k＜1). Another possibility is that two firms locate
at (k, k) and the other firms choose (－k,－k). However,
if n is odd, such symmetry would break down. Hence,
this extension is quite complicated. Furthermore, more
extension in dimensionality also causes complexity. Let
these be the tasks of future research.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Differentiating the social surplus with regard to
x0 and evaluating it at x0＝0, we have
ss
x0
│
│x0＝0＝－
32t2
3b
(x1＋x2).
The first−order condition requires x1＋x2＝0.
Conversely, assume that x1＋x2＝0. Then, we have
ss
x0
│
│x2＝−x1＝－
8t2
b
(a/t＋4x21＋2y21＋2y22－5x20－5y20－4)x0.
Because a/t＞24 from (2) , the value of the parenthesis
is positive. Therefore, ss is maximized at x0＝0.
Hence, the public firm locates at x0＝0 if and only if x1
＋x2＝0. Due to symmetry, we can apply identical analy-
sis with regard to y−coodinate.
B. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Under the scheme of central symmetry, we im-
mediately have that ss is maximized at (x0, y0)＝(0, 0)
from Lemma 1. Hence, we can set (x0, y0)＝(0, 0). Due
to symmetry, we focus on firm 1. Without loss of
generality, we assume that －1y1x10. Let
（
L, （LL
be the domains such that
（
L＝{(x , y) :－1yx0, (x－1)2＋(y＋1)22},）
L＝{(x , y) :－1yx0, (x－1)2＋(y＋1)22},
Then, we can find that the market boundary of d0(x, y)
＝d1(x , y) intersects the lines of x＝－1 and y＝－1 if
firm 1 locates in
（
L, whereas the boundary intersects
the lines of x＝1 and x＝－1 if firm 1 locates in
）
L.
We will investigate the properties of profit function in
each case, and will obtain an optimal location by
synthesis at the end.
First, we seek a maximizer in
（
L. The profit function of
firm 1 is given by
Π1＝
t2[(x0＋1)2＋(y0＋1)2－(x1＋1)2－(y1＋1)2]4
48b(x0－x1)(y0－y1)
with (x0, y0)＝(0, 0). The first−order conditions yield the
following, simplified equations:
Figure 4. The locational adjustment of the private firm. The dotted lines show the market boundaries.
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6x1＋7x21－2y1－y21＝0, 6y1＋7y21－2x1－x21＝0.
The solution is only (x1, y1)＝(−2/3, −2/3), which also
satisfies the second−order condition. Furthermore, we
can readily show that no corner solutions exist. Hence,
(x1, y1)＝(−2/3, −2/3) is the unique maximizer in
（
L.
Second, we seek a maximizer in
）
L. By tedious calcu-
lations, we get the profit function of firm 1, and we can
show that there is no interior solution that satisfies the
first−order conditions in
）
L. Also, we can readily show
that no corner solutions exist at each point on each edge.
Thus, there is a maximizer on (x－1)2＋(y＋1)2＝2 in）
L. However, this is never the global maximizer because
we can easily confirm the differentiability of the profit
function at each point on (x－1)2＋(y＋1)2＝2 despite
the change in the definition of the function between in（
L and in
）
L.
The synthesis shows that (x1, y1)＝(−2/3, −2/3) is the
unique optimal location when (x0, y0)＝(0, 0). By symme-
try, the profit of firm 2 is maximized at (x2, y2)＝(2/3,
2/3) under (x0, y0)＝(0, 0). Therefore, the location pair
of (x0, y0, x1, y1, x2, y2)＝(0, 0, −2/3, −2/3, 2/3, 2/3) is the
unique equilibrium under central symmetry.
Notes :
1) See also, among others, DeFraja and Delbono (1989) for
an excellent, comprehensive analysis in the literature.
2) There are several papers with a different focus of interest
in mixed oligopoly with location choice. See Matsushima
and Matsumura (2006) and Heywood and Ye (2009)
with foreign firms, and Li (2006) with multi−plant firms.
Lu (2006) deals with mill pricing, and Matsumura and
Matsushima (2003) study sequential choice of location.
3) Without a public firm, Pal (1998) and Matsushima (2001)
show that such a full agglomeration of private firms does
not occur in the circular space.
4) Ago (2008) also showed the central agglomeration is a
unique equilibrium when space is a rectangle.
5) Recall that we omit other symmetric equilibria like (x0,
y0, x1, y1, x2, y2)＝(0, 0, 2/3, −2/3, −2/3, 2/3) because it is
essentially the same equilibrium in this proposition.
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